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Affirmation of Tribal
Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Nonmember American Indians
O nApril 19, 2004, the UnitedStates Supreme Court decidedUnited States v Lira,' a landmark
case in federal American-Indian law. Lara
upheld the authority of American-Indian
tribes to prosecute nonmember American
Indians and held that such prosecutions do
not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause be-
cause an American-Indian tribe is "acting in
its capacity of a separate sovereign." All Mich-
igan tribes have significant numbers of non-
member American Indians-members of
other American-Indian tribes and Canadian
Indians-living in their Indian Country. The
Lara decision clarifies an important area of
law for the Michigan tribes-whether Amer-
ican-Indian tribes have inherent authority to
prosecute nonmember American Indians.
Tribal Criminal jurisdiction
Criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country
is a complicated doctrine of law with practi-
tioners often relying on a chart to decide
which sovereign may prosecute in a particu-
lar case. 2 The complications arose over the
course of more than 150 years of Supreme
Cou rt jurisprudence and several Acts of Con-
gress. In the early 19th century case known
as the Marshall Trilogy,3 the Supreme Court
first formulated its opinion of the relation-
ship of American-Indian tribes as sovereign
governments within the two-sovereign struc-
ture established by the United States Con-
stitution. Chief Justice Marshall rejected ar-
guments that American-Indian tribes were
foreign nations and instead described them as
"domestic dependent nations."4 As "domestic
dependent nations," American-Indian tribes
possess criminal jurisdiction in Indian Coun-
try that is "complete, inherent, and exclu-
sive," except as liited by Congress.5 As such,
American-Indian tribes have exclusive juris-
diction over crimes committed by American
Indians against American Indians in Indian
Country.6 "Indian Country" is defined as all
lands within American-Indian reservations,
all dependent American-Indian communi-
ties, and all American-Indian allotments.-
Indian Country in Michigan, for example.
includes reservation land and all land held in
trust by the United States for the benefit of
the tribes or individual American Indians. 8 At
least nine Michigan American-Indian tribes
have reservation or truSt land in Michigan.
In Indian Country, the state has no criminal
jurisdiction over American Indians. 9
However, the federal limitations on tribal
criminal jurisdiction are significant. First,
the Indian Civil Rights Act constris tribes
to sentencing offenders convicted in tribal
courts to one year m prison and $5,000 in
fines.10 The Supreme Court articulated the
second, and perhaps the most critical, limita-
tion in Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tibe,fl
where the Court held that American-Indian
tribes do not have jurisdiction over non-
American Indians. The federal government
has exclusive jurisdiction in Indian Country
over crimes committed by non-American
24]
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Indians against American Indians12 and the
state has exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
committed by non-American Indians against
non-American Indians.13 In Oliphant, the
Court relied upon the novel theory that
American-Indian tribes had been implicitly
divested of the inherent authority to prose-
cute non-American Indians, noting that it
was inconsistent with their status. Scholars
harshly criticized that holding, largely be-
cause the Court didn't (and couldn't) say ex-
actly when or how tribes' inherent authority
had been divested. 14
American-Indian tribes and the federal
government have concurrent jurisdiction over
14 serious crimes, listed in the Major Crimes
Act, 15 committed by American Indians. 16
Naturally, since an American Indian may be
prosecuted twice-once by the tribe and
once by the U.S. Attorney-for a crime in
Indian Country, double jeopardy concerns
arise. The Supreme Court put those con-
cerns to rest in the 1978 case United States v
Wheeler17 where the Court relied upon the
dual sovereignty exception to the double
jeopardy prohibition18 because the federal
government and American-Indian tribes are
separate sovereigns. 19
Wheeler and Oliphant presaged later deci-
sions of the Court that shifted the law of
tribal criminal jurisdiction by implying that
American-Indian tribes could only prosecute
their own members. Wheeler involved a claim
under the Double Jeopardy Clause by a mem-
ber against the convictions of both the federal
government and his own tribe. The Court
upheld the inherent authority of the tribe to
prosecute the petitioner but created an ele-
ment of doubt as to whether American-
Indian tribes could prosecute nonmembers
by referring not to 'American Indians" but to
"members." Completing the circle in 1990,
the Court held that American-Indian tribes
do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-
member American Indians in Duro v Reina,20
reasoning that American-Indian tribes had
been implicitly divested of their inherent au-
thority to prosecute allnonmembers, includ-
ing nonmember American Indians.
The "Duro Fix"
American-Indian tribes went into an up-
roar following Duro. The Court in Duro es-
tablished an arbitrary line by differentiating
between members and nonmembers instead
of American Indians and non-American Indi-
ans. Nonmember American Indians play a
significant role in the daily life of any Amer-
ican-Indian community-they participate
in cultural ceremonies and powwows, they
intermarry, they may be drawn to other
American-Indian communities through the
operation of the foster care and adoption pro-
visions of the Indian Child Welfare Act and
federal health, housing, and educational pro-
grams, and most importantly they are valued
and essential members of the American-
Indian community. 2' The Court's reliance
upon the membership of an American Indian
was completely out of tune with the reality on
the ground-nonmember American Indians
are far more integrated into an American-
Indian community than tourists in a foreign
land. In response, Congress exercised its ple-
nary authority and quickly enacted what be-
came known as the "Duro fix," amending the
Indian Civil Rights Act to restore and affirm
the "inherent power of Indian tribes... to ex-
ercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians," 22
expressly avoiding the language of a delega-
tion of federal authority.
Nonmember American Indians subjected
to dual tribal and federal prosecutions imme-
diately challenged the Duro fix on the ground
that Congress did not have the authority to
restore and affirm" the inherent authority of
American-Indian tribes to prosecute non-
member American Indians.23 These petition-
ers argued that once a tribe's inherent au-
thority to prosecute nonmember American
Indians had been divested by operation of
history, it could not be returned by an Act of
Congress. The theory was that, if Congress
could not "restore and affirm" the inherent
authority of tribes, then Congress could only
delegate its own authority to the tribes. If
that were the case, then both the tribes and
the federal government would be prosecut-
ing nonmember American Indians with fed-
eral authority, implicating the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause.
Congress's
Plenary Power
Because the states repudiated their author-
ity to regulate American-Indian affairs dur-
ing the ratification of the United States Con-
stitution, the federal government retained
plenary and exclusive authority to regulate
American-Indian affairs.24 The Indian Com-
merce Clause became the main source of ple-
nary Congressional authority over American-
Indian affairs. Congress has exercised this
authority to define the parameters of crimi-
nal jurisdiction in Indian Country several
times in the last two centuries, including the
enactment of the Major Crimes Act 25 and
the Indian Country Crimes Act.26 The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly affirmed the ple-
nary power of Congress to enact statutes for
the benefit of American-Indian tribes and in-
dividual American Indians. 27
Importantly, Congress relied upon its ple-
nary power to enact dozens of other statutes
that compose much of the statutory au-
thority upon which the federal government
operates its much-needed programs for the
benefit of American-Indian tribes. Congress
enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act,28 the
I25
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Preserving tribal jurisdiction over nonmember American
Indians goes a long way toward ensuring the swift
response required for most of the potentially deadly
domestic violence situations in Indian Country.
Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act,29 the Native American Hous-
ing and Self-Determination Act,30 the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act,31 and many other
statutes, relying upon its plenary power to
legislate on behalf of American Indians.
Billy Jo Lara
Billy Jo Lara is a member of the Turtle
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians in
North Dakota. He married a member of the
Spirit Lake tribe in North Dakota and moved
to that reservation, a common circumstance
on all American-Indian reservations. Accord-
ing to the federal prosecutor, Assistant United
States Attorney Janice Morley, and the Spirit
Lake tribal prosecutor, Michelle Rivard, Lara
began to repeatedly disturb the peace and
perpetrate domestic violence, steadily increas-
ing the violence of his crimes, until he was
banished from the Spirit Lake Reservation. 32
As is de unfortunate signature of many do-
mestic violence cases, Lara returned and was
arrested by a Bureau of Indian Affairs officer,
who happen to be cross-deputized by the
tribe. When Lara knocked out one of the ar-
resting officers, the tribe prosecuted Lara,
followed shortly thereafter by the United
States Attorney's Office prosecution for as-
saulting a federal officer.,33
Following the arguments made by pre-
vious nonmember American-Indian defen-
dants, Lara argued that the federal prosecu-
tion violated the Double Jeopardy Clause
because the Duro fix was a delegation of fed-
eral authority. Though the federal district
court and a three-judge panel of the eighth
circuit disagreed with Lara,34 the eighth cir-
cuit re-heard the case en banc and reversed,
holding that the Duro fix was a delegation of
federal power, invalidating the federal con-
viction. 35 Because the eighth circuit decision
conflicted with the decisions of two other
circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiori
and, subsequently, reversed that court.36
Importance to Michigan
American-Indian Tribes
Lara establishes that Michigan tribes have
the inherent authority to prosecute nonmem-
ber American Indians living in each of their
communities. A decision adverse to the fed-
eral government would have meant that only
the United States Attorney could prosecute
nonmember American Indians for crimes in
Michigan Indian Country. Crimes such as
domestic violence and misdemeanors call for
a swift local response, a response the federal
government, despite the best efforts of the
U.S. Attorneys, can rarely offer due to their
lack of resources and distance from most
Michigan reservations.7 Preserving tribal ju-
risdiction over nonmember American Indi-
ans goes a long way toward ensuring the
swift response required for most of the po-
tentially deadly domestic violence situations
in Indian Country.
The Lara decision also strongly supported
the plenary power of Congress to legislate for
the benefit of American-Indian tribes, a doc-
trine that had come under fire in recent years.
Many American-Indian law commentators
had worried that the Court would invalidate
the Duro fix and eviscerate Congressional
power to regulate American-Indian affairs. 38
For if Congress could not validly create the
Duro fix, then there might be fodder that
Congress couldn't enact the Indian Child
Welfare Act and other statutes enacted to as-
sist American Indians and American-Indian
tribes. Lara largely put that question to rest,
affirming Congressional plenary power and
holding that Congress had authority to relax
"restrictions on tribal sovereign authority"3 9
Lara affirms that Congress has power to re-
define the metes and bounds of tribal sover-
eignty even after the Supreme Court has lim-
ited tribal authority *
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